

# Measuring EU global value chains' dependencies with Russia

International Seminar: "Post-COVID Value Chains: Use of the Sub-Regional Input-Output Tables of the Pacific Alliance and FIGARO as impact assessment tools"

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**Global value chains indicators** such as the OECD's TiVA help **understanding better** the increased **fragmentation** of worldwide trade and **how value added is traded** all around the world.



Source: Ferrero, Sourcemap and various on-line sources.

### Value Added in Trade / Trade in Value Added

#### VA/EMP/CO2 in EU EXPORTS



#### VA/EMP/CO2 in EU FINAL DEMAND





## INTRODUCTION

- TiVA indicators provide complementary information to conventional bilateral trade balances, differentiating the foreign and domestic fractions of the value added content of traded products
- TiVA indicators can be useful for measuring the **potential impact** on value added of a **disruption in international trade** (e.g. war, political conflict, pandemic)
- In the context of **COVID-19** or the **Russian invasion to Ukraine**, what can be learnt from standard TiVA indicators?
- All VA dependencies between two regions included in standard TiVA indicators? → We combined two standard TiVA indicators for a full exposure indicator



## **OECD TIVA INDICATORS**

#### EXGR\_DVA

- 1. Domestic Value Added in **Gross Exports**
- 2. Informs on the value added generated in the EU's direct domestic exports to Russia, either for intermediate or for final uses

Final products

Intermediate products



## **OECD TiVA INDICATORS**

#### → Final products

---→ Intermediate products

#### **FFD\_DVA**

- 1. Domestic Value Added in Foreign Final Demand
- Records the EU value added supported by (Russian) foreign final demand





## OECD TiVA INDICATORS (revisited)

#### **VUL\_DVA**

- 1. Domestic Value Added in **Gross Exports**
- 2. Informs on the value added generated in the EU's direct domestic exports to Russia, either for intermediate or for final uses
- 3. Adds the value added generated in the EU exports to third countries ending in Russian final demand



---> Intermediate products







al time series available from 2010 for the European Union of 27 Member States, the United Ki the United States and 17 main EU partners.

## **Results: overview**

EU	1	2	3	4	Total
EXGR_DVA	14.9		36.6	32.2	83.7(-7%)
FFD_DVA		6.6	36.6	32.2	75.4 (-14%)
VUL_DVA	14.9 (17%)	6.6 (7%)	36.6 (41%)	32.2 (36%)	90.3

3.5% of all extra EU exports



30% of Russian exports







## **Results by Member States**



Share (%) of EXGR\_DVUL due to EU exports to third countries ending up in Russia's final demand



Share (%) of FFD\_DVUL due to foreign final demand of third countries, via Russia



## **Results: EU industries**



- Variation across EU industries between 18% (water transport) and 5% (publishing act.)
- C26 (electronics) → 5% of all exports (openness 38%) → VUL\_DVA includes 17% more exposure
- C20 (chemical industry) → 5% of all exports (openness 26%) → VUL\_DVA includes 10% more exp.



## **Conclusions and further steps**

- The analysis of vulnerabilities arising from COVID19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine requires a combination of two OECD TiVA indicators, i.e. EXGR\_DVA and FFD\_DVA, into one single indicator of vulnerability VUL\_DVA.
- Using TiVA indicators separately could underestimate by 7% the vulnerabilities of the EU with respect to Russia for exports and by 17% for foreign final demand, in both cases because of missing indirect spillovers via third countries' participation.
- Further analysis by **industries** in the pipeline...





## Thank you very much!

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