

European Response to the Global Financial Crisis

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
Global crisis revealed euro area weaknesses

Euro as an unfinished project:

- + **common monetary policy;**
- + **financial market integration.**
- **multiple fiscal and structural policies;**
- **weak and fragmented supervision, lack of cross-border bank resolution regime.**


The Euro – good project for good times

Credibility shelter for the periphery.



Increased creditworthiness induced high capital inflow


Real 3m interbank rates, in %




Effects of euro area membership for the peripheral countries:

- Significant decrease in nominal and real interest rates.
- Increased foreign capital inflow, mainly into non-tradeables sectors (inter alia construction).
- Large investment in housing started a boom-bust cycle in the periphery.

Foreign capital inflow, in % of GDP




House prices, Q1 2002=100




Eroding competitiveness

A bulk of capital inflow did not strengthen the competitiveness.

Unit labour costs, Q1 2000=100




ULC deflated REER, Jan. 2002=100




* Ireland – business sector, rest – total economy

Faster convergence but at a cost of growing external imbalances


Current account balance, Germany vs. rest of the euro area, EUR mn



Current account balance in the peripheral countries, in % of GDP




External debt, in % of GDP




Greece – an example of weak supervision over national fiscal policies in the euro area

General government balance in Greece, in % of GDP




Global crisis effects on European economy





GDP growth rate, in %, y-o-y



General government balance, in % of GDP





EU vs. US – the national accounts perspective



- Generally synchronous slowdown and recovery in economic activity.
- Similar output loss of up to 4-5% in terms of real GDP level in both regions.
- Sharper drop in consumption and investment in the US but shallower contraction of exports.
- More rapid recovery in the US.

EU vs. US - labour markets developments




Note: 2007:Q4 treated as the business cycle peak.

Source: BLS, Eurostat, NBP calculations.

- **Generally synchronous worsening of labour market conditions.**
- **Sharper deterioration of labour market conditions in the US.**
- **Both regions stuck at present with high unemployment: EU – 9.5%, US – 8.8%.**

Periphery slows down euro area recovery

GDP growth rate, in %, y-o-y




GDP forecasts by the IMF, in %, y-o-y


	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Euro area	-4,1	1,7	1,6	1,8	1,8
United States	-2,6	2,8	2,8	2,9	2,7
Emerging economies	2,7	7,3	6,5	6,5	6,5
Germany	-4,7	3,5	2,5	2,1	1,9
France	-2,5	1,5	1,6	1,8	2,0
Netherlands	-3,9	1,7	1,5	1,5	1,6
Austria	-3,9	2,0	2,4	2,3	2,2
Belgium	-2,7	2,0	1,7	1,9	1,9
Finland	-8,2	3,1	3,1	2,5	2,2
Luxembourg	-3,7	3,4	3,0	3,1	3,2
Greece	-2,0	-4,5	-3,0	1,1	2,1
Ireland	-7,6	-1,0	0,5	1,9	2,4
Italy	-5,2	1,3	1,1	1,3	1,4
Portugal	-2,5	1,4	-1,5	-0,5	0,9
Spain	-3,7	-0,1	0,8	1,6	1,8

First European experience of a serious financial crisis

Current account balance, in % of GDP



Foreign capital net inflow, in % of GDP



Previous financial crises in Latin America (1980's) and Asia (1990's) resulted in a number of social, political and economic reforms that changed its growth models.

European response to the crisis – success of common policy

- **Temporary measures aimed at stimulating domestic demand and restoring financial stability (stimuli plans).**
- **Common response to the debt crises in the peripheral countries.**
- **Reforms of the European institutional framework**

Response to the debt crises in the euro area

Financial aid to the troubled countries (mutual EU and IMF deals):

- Greece – EUR 110 bn – aimed at restoring public finance stability and regaining competitiveness.
- Ireland – EUR 85 bn – aimed at restoring financial system and public finance stability.
- Portugal – EUR 78 bn – aimed at restoring the public finance stability.

Reforms - restoring competitiveness in the euro area

Pact for the Euro:

- **Fostering competitiveness.**
- **Fostering employment.**
- **Contributing further to the sustainability of public finances.**
- **Reinforcing financial stability.**

Reforms - strengthening of European institutional framework

New euro area crisis management framework:

- **Strengthened discipline of the Stability and Growth Pact.**
- **Macro-prudential supervision – European Systemic Risk Board.**
- **Micro-prudential supervision – European Supervisory Authorities.**
- **Support for the euro area countries in financial difficulty - European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to become permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from mid-2013 onwards.**


Challenges ahead

- **Public debt restructuring.**
- **Succesfull implementation of undertaken reforms.**


Central and Eastern Europe – response to the crisis

- **High trade openness and integrity with the rest of Europe.**

Exports as % of GDP, 2007




Exports directions



- **Dependence on foreign capital inflow.**

Foreign capital net inflow to the CEE region, in % of GDP



CEE weathered the crisis better than expected



- **CEE countries suffered more severely from the crisis than other emerging markets.**

- **The worst, however, had been avoided:**
 - ✓ **no massive foreign capital outflow (especially from the banking sector);**
 - ✓ **no currency crises;**
 - ✓ **no bailouts.**


EU solidarity and willingness to reform helped fighting the crisis effects

Mutual IMF & EU financial aid for the CEE countries:

- Hungary – EUR 20 bn;
- Latvia – EUR 7.5 bn;
- Romania – EUR 20 bn;
- non-EU countries:
 - Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine.



Vienna Initiative – preventing a large-scale and uncoordinated withdrawal of cross-border bank groups from the region.

Poor economic, financial and fiscal performance.





Fiscal austerity plans – tax hikes and expenditure cuts (especially severe in the Baltic states).

Improved financial markets supervision.



The road ahead

GDP growth forecasts, in % y-o-y



Source: IMF WEO, April 2011.

Thank you!